Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tyler Burge, Douglas Lackey and Terence Horgan

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
13479 Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8132 We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17622 We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
21554 Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
21553 It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
16901 The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
9159 You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
16902 Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16052 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T]
16053 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16056 Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16054 Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
16055 Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
16892 Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
9382 Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
16057 Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
8126 Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
8127 Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
8129 Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
8131 Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3115 Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
14349 If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]