38 ideas
| 8250 | So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra] |
| 13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
| 8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
| 17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
| 16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
| 9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
| 16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
| 8719 | There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
| 8971 | There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong] |
| 8718 | Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
| 7756 | Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan] |
| 15781 | The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong] |
| 5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
| 5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
| 16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
| 6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
| 19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
| 19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
| 19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
| 19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
| 19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
| 19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
| 19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| 5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
| 8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
| 8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
| 5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
| 5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
| 5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
| 5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
| 5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
| 8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
| 8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
| 5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
| 5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
| 3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
| 14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |