12 ideas
21239 | Philosophers are marked by a joint love of evidence and ambiguity [Merleau-Ponty] |
8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
21862 | Consciousness is based on 'I can', not on 'I think' [Merleau-Ponty] |
20750 | The mind does not unite perceptions, because they flow into one another [Merleau-Ponty] |
8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |