14 ideas
| 22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
| 8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |
| 22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 18088 | Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place] |
| 18089 | Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place] |