Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Vann McGee, Jennifer Fisher and John McDowell

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
8952 We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
8251 The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8943 Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
8945 Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
8951 Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
18755 Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
8950 Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18751 Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18761 Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18753 An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18754 Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
18757 Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
18760 The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
8946 We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
8947 If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
8128 Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
19092 There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8253 Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
18762 A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
8254 Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell]