14 ideas
11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
3568 | Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts? [Cross,A] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |