Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Vassilis Politis, Jean Baudrillard and Alvin Plantinga

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say [Baudrillard]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Some continental philosophers are relativists - Baudrillard, for example [Baudrillard, by Critchley]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality [Baudrillard]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Drunken boat pilots are less likely to collide than clearly focused ones [Baudrillard]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Instead of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, they now cancel out, and the conflict is levelled [Baudrillard]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Without God we faced reality: what do we face without reality? [Baudrillard]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life [Baudrillard]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
In modern times, being useless is the essential aesthetic ingredient for an object [Baudrillard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Good versus evil has been banefully reduced to happiness versus misfortune [Baudrillard]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Whole populations are terrorist threats to authorities, who unite against them [Baudrillard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
People like democracy because it means they can avoid power [Baudrillard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only in the last 200 years have people demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals [Baudrillard]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
The arrival of the news media brought history to an end [Baudrillard]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide is ascribed to depression, with the originality of the act of will ignored [Baudrillard]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
Pascal says secular life is acceptable, but more fun with the hypothesis of God [Baudrillard]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG]