29 ideas
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
7810 | The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus shows blood feuds replaced by law [Aeschylus, by Grayling] |