Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Volker Halbach, Peter Geach and William James

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131 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
A single explanation must have a single point of view [James]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach]
Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach]
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach]
If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James]
New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James]
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach]
The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach]
To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach]
Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach]
Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach]
Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach]
We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach]
A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG]
The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach]
Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach]
Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach]
The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach]
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach]
The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach]
Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach]
Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach]
In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach]
Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach]
Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach]
The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James]
We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James]
Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James]
For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]
The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James]
Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
Private experience is the main evidence for God [James]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James]