30 ideas
| 9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
| 20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20400 | Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S] |
| 7266 | The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
| 7267 | Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
| 7268 | The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
| 7269 | The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
| 7271 | Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
| 9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
| 9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
| 9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
| 9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
| 9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
| 9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
| 9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
| 9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |