Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for W. David Ross, Adrian Bardon and Richard Boyd

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66 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross]
Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross]
We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross]
Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
The properties of an electron can't be explained just as 'clustering' [Chakravartty on Boyd]
Properties cluster together, either because of intrinsic relations, or because of an underlying process [Boyd, by Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon]
The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon]
The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon]
We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon]
The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon]
The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon]
It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon]
We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon]
Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / j. Time travel
At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon]
Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon]