70 ideas
21238 | Later phenomenologists tried hard to incorporate social relationships [Bakewell] |
21237 | Phenomenology begins from the immediate, rather than from axioms and theories [Bakewell] |
14273 | Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington] |
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge] |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington] |
14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington] |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington] |
14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington] |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
14275 | Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington] |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
14274 | Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington] |
14276 | The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington] |
14290 | Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington] |
13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington] |
14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington] |
13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington] |
14278 | Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington] |
14287 | Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington] |
5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |