71 ideas
| 18074 | Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher] |
| 12430 | Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher] |
| 12431 | I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher] |
| 6298 | Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik] |
| 12392 | Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher] |
| 18078 | The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher] |
| 12426 | The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher] |
| 12395 | Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher] |
| 12425 | Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher] |
| 18071 | A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher] |
| 18066 | The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher] |
| 18083 | With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher] |
| 18061 | Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher] |
| 12420 | If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher] |
| 12393 | Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher] |
| 12387 | Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher] |
| 12412 | My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher] |
| 18065 | We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher] |
| 18077 | The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher] |
| 12423 | Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher] |
| 18069 | Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher] |
| 18068 | Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher] |
| 18070 | We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher] |
| 18072 | Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher] |
| 18063 | Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher] |
| 18064 | If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher] |
| 15682 | Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman] |
| 15691 | Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman] |
| 18067 | Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher] |
| 15700 | In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman] |
| 15685 | Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman] |
| 15684 | Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman] |
| 15681 | Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman] |
| 15678 | Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman] |
| 15683 | Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman] |
| 15697 | Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman] |
| 15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
| 15679 | Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman] |
| 15698 | We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman] |
| 15709 | Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman] |
| 16698 | Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley] |
| 16690 | Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley] |
| 15696 | Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman] |
| 12428 | Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher] |
| 12429 | Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher] |
| 15707 | There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman] |
| 12390 | A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher] |
| 12418 | In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher] |
| 12389 | Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher] |
| 12416 | We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher] |
| 16719 | The primary qualities are mixed to cause secondary qualities [Burley] |
| 15703 | Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman] |
| 12413 | A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher] |
| 20473 | If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo] |
| 15708 | Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman] |
| 15694 | Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman] |
| 15695 | Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman] |
| 15692 | People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman] |
| 18075 | Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher] |
| 15680 | Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman] |
| 15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
| 15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
| 15688 | Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman] |
| 15689 | Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman] |
| 15699 | Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman] |
| 15693 | One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman] |
| 15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
| 15705 | Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman] |
| 15702 | Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman] |
| 15704 | Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman] |
| 15706 | A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman] |