38 ideas
| 18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
| 17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
| 17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
| 17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
| 17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
| 17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
| 17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
| 6552 | You can only explain the qualities of large objects using entities which lack those qualities [Heisenberg] |
| 18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 7258 | The forefather of modern intuitionism is Richard Price [Price,R, by Dancy,J] |
| 17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
| 17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
| 17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
| 17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
| 17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
| 17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
| 17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
| 17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
| 17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
| 17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |