182 ideas
| 8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
| 17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
| 10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
| 4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
| 7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
| 8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
| 9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
| 5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
| 9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
| 9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
| 9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
| 9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
| 9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
| 9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
| 9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
| 9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
| 9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
| 9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
| 9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
| 9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
| 8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
| 12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
| 5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
| 9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 8386 | Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
| 11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
| 12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
| 22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
| 13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
| 13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 3583 | External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
| 16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
| 13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
| 16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
| 16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
| 17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
| 13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
| 14366 | An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens] |
| 13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
| 13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
| 13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
| 17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
| 13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
| 13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
| 16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
| 17093 | Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon] |
| 17492 | Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon] |
| 13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
| 16557 | Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
| 13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
| 13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
| 13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
| 13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
| 16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 3537 | I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
| 9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
| 9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
| 3772 | The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill] |
| 7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
| 3769 | With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill] |
| 3767 | Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill] |
| 7076 | Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley] |
| 3771 | Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill] |
| 3768 | Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill] |
| 7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
| 7202 | The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill] |
| 5935 | Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill] |
| 3764 | Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill] |
| 3776 | Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill] |
| 3765 | Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill] |
| 3763 | Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill] |
| 3766 | Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill] |
| 3770 | General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill] |
| 6697 | Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill] |
| 7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
| 3773 | No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill] |
| 3774 | Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill] |
| 7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
| 7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
| 7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
| 7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
| 20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
| 20508 | How people vote should be on public record, so they can be held accountable [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20507 | Voting is a strict duty, like jury service, and must only be aimed at the public good [Mill] |
| 20505 | Direct democracy is inexperience judging experience, and ignorance judging knowledge [Mill] |
| 20504 | People can only participate in decisions in small communities, so representatives are needed [Mill] |
| 7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
| 7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
| 7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
| 7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
| 20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
| 7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
| 7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
| 7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
| 7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
| 7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
| 3775 | A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill] |
| 7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
| 7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
| 7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
| 7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 8387 | A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties [Crane] |
| 8412 | A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon] |
| 8413 | Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon] |
| 8411 | Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon] |
| 4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
| 10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
| 14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
| 8409 | Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science [Salmon] |
| 8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
| 8384 | The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved [Crane] |
| 14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
| 4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
| 21332 | We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic [Mill] |
| 7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |
| 21333 | Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil [Mill] |
| 21335 | Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust [Mill] |
| 21334 | No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery [Mill] |
| 21329 | Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice [Mill] |
| 21328 | Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures [Mill] |
| 21330 | Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother [Mill] |
| 21331 | Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death [Mill] |