Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Wilhelm Dilthey, Jonathan Kvanvig and Peter Alexander

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
5437 The claim of hermeneutics to give knowledge through understanding is challenged by positivism [Mautner on Dilthey]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
15959 If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
15956 The peripatetics treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter, and non-material [Alexander,P]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
5436 Natural science seeks explanation; human sciences seek understanding [Dilthey, by Mautner]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
15975 Can the qualities of a body be split into two groups, where the smaller explains the larger? [Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
15963 Science has been partly motivated by the belief that the universe is run by God's laws [Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
15951 Alchemists tried to separate out essences, which influenced later chemistry [Alexander,P]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
15981 Absolute space either provides locations, or exists but lacks 'marks' for locations [Alexander,P]