36 ideas
19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
5437 | The claim of hermeneutics to give knowledge through understanding is challenged by positivism [Mautner on Dilthey] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
5436 | Natural science seeks explanation; human sciences seek understanding [Dilthey, by Mautner] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |