84 ideas
22659 | It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James] |
22657 | All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James] |
7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
22647 | A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James] |
7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
22648 | A single explanation must have a single point of view [James] |
22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
22644 | Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James] |
7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
6710 | You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James] |
18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
22305 | If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James] |
17818 | How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau] |
17822 | Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau] |
17817 | Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau] |
17815 | We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau] |
17821 | You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau] |
7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
22649 | Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James] |
7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
22655 | Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James] |
22658 | Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James] |
18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
22654 | We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James] |
22656 | Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James] |
22646 | We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James] |
22652 | The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James] |
22651 | Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James] |
9286 | Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James] |
7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
9285 | 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James] |
23981 | Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James] |
22650 | How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James] |
22643 | It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James] |
18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
22660 | Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James] |
6570 | Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James] |
22645 | Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James] |
18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
22653 | Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James] |
18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |