115 ideas
22659 | It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James] |
22657 | All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James] |
22647 | A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James] |
22648 | A single explanation must have a single point of view [James] |
22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
22644 | Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James] |
6710 | You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James] |
18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
22305 | If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
22649 | Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James] |
18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
22655 | Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James] |
22658 | Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James] |
18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
22654 | We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James] |
22656 | Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
22646 | We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James] |
22652 | The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James] |
22651 | Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James] |
9286 | Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James] |
9285 | 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James] |
23981 | Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James] |
22650 | How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James] |
22643 | It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James] |
18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
22660 | Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James] |
6570 | Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
22645 | Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James] |
18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
22653 | Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James] |
18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |