112 ideas
| 22659 | It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James] |
| 22657 | All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James] |
| 22647 | A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James] |
| 8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
| 8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
| 22648 | A single explanation must have a single point of view [James] |
| 8594 | People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker] |
| 22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
| 22644 | Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James] |
| 6710 | You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James] |
| 18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
| 18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
| 18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
| 18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
| 22305 | If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James] |
| 18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
| 15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
| 8596 | Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker] |
| 8597 | We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker] |
| 22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
| 22649 | Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James] |
| 15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
| 15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
| 15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
| 8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
| 8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
| 8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
| 15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
| 15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
| 15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
| 15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
| 12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
| 8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
| 15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
| 15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
| 15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
| 15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
| 8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
| 4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
| 15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
| 14534 | Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
| 9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
| 8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
| 18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
| 18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
| 8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
| 15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
| 8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
| 15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
| 15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
| 15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
| 8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
| 19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
| 18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
| 5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
| 18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
| 19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
| 19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
| 19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
| 19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
| 19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
| 22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
| 19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
| 19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
| 19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
| 8593 | Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker] |
| 22655 | Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James] |
| 22658 | Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James] |
| 18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
| 18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
| 18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
| 22654 | We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James] |
| 8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
| 15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
| 22656 | Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James] |
| 22646 | We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James] |
| 22652 | The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James] |
| 22651 | Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James] |
| 9286 | Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James] |
| 5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
| 5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
| 1389 | If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker] |
| 1390 | Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG] |
| 9285 | 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James] |
| 23981 | Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James] |
| 22650 | How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James] |
| 22643 | It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James] |
| 18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
| 22660 | Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James] |
| 6570 | Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James] |
| 8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
| 22645 | Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James] |
| 8598 | If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
| 8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
| 15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |
| 4226 | If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe] |
| 8595 | If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker] |
| 18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
| 18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
| 18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
| 18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
| 18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
| 18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
| 22653 | Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James] |
| 18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |