Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for William S. Jevons, Michael Smith and Tuomas E. Tahko

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8628 I hold that algebra and number are developments of logic [Jevons]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16978 If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16975 Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
16976 Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
16977 If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]