58 ideas
6405 | Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling] |
17992 | The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE] |
7527 | Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
8628 | I hold that algebra and number are developments of logic [Jevons] |
21342 | A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil] |
6672 | Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe] |
20147 | Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE] |
6349 | I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE] |
24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
7526 | Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
21233 | The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE] |
8039 | Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
22151 | The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE] |
11056 | The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE] |
8033 | Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
8032 | Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
11050 | Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE] |
23726 | Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M] |
18676 | We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE] |
11057 | It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE] |
5925 | The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
5902 | For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
5903 | 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE] |
24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
5907 | Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE] |
23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |