52 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
13416 | Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C] |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |