Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for William W. Tait, J.L. Mackie and Ray Monk

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
We overvalue whether arguments are valid, and undervalue whether they are interesting [Monk]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait]
Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait]
If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency [Monk]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG]
Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG]