Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for William W. Tait, Johann Fichte and Peter Schulte

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69 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte]
There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte]
Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte]
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie]
Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte]
Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
Effective individuals must posit a specific material body for themselves [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte]
Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait]
Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait]
If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte]
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]