Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for William W. Tait, Julio Cesare Vanini and Francisco Surez

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait]
Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait]
If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is nothing but its parts [Vanini]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]