Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for William W. Tait, Penelope Mackie and Gregory Vlastos

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
9978 Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
9986 The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
9984 We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
13416 Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9981 Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait]
9982 Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
9985 Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9972 Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait]
9980 If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
1658 In early Greece the word for punishment was also the word for vengeance [Vlastos]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]