22 ideas
| 9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
| 9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
| 9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
| 13416 | Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C] |
| 14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
| 14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
| 14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
| 19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
| 19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
| 19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
| 19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
| 12893 | Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S] |
| 12896 | Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S] |
| 12894 | There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S] |
| 19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
| 14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
| 9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
| 9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
| 9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
| 9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
| 9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |
| 14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |