35 ideas
9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
13416 | Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C] |
11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
19284 | Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn] |
14629 | If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn] |
14529 | If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |
23996 | Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn] |
11911 | Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn] |
2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
23223 | The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |