18 ideas
21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
13416 | Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C] |
6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
6900 | A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway] |
6956 | At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway] |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
7335 | The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway] |
6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |