31 ideas
8093 | Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert] |
8095 | We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert] |
8107 | The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert] |
8099 | The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert] |
8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
8094 | The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert] |
8103 | A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert] |
8100 | Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert] |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
3032 | I can form no notion of what the good is [Amphis] |
8096 | He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert] |
8104 | What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert] |
8097 | Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert] |
8106 | In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert] |
8105 | We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert] |
8102 | We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert] |