32 ideas
1212 | Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch] |
5958 | The sun is always bright; it doesn't become bright when it emerges [Plutarch] |
5959 | Some philosophers say the soul is light [Plutarch] |
5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
5952 | Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch] |
5951 | If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch] |
5963 | Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch] |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
20796 | Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch] |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
1477 | Being manly and brave is the result of convention, not of human nature [Plutarch] |
3032 | I can form no notion of what the good is [Amphis] |
1478 | Animals don't value pleasure, as they cease sexual intercourse after impregnation [Plutarch] |
5948 | The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch] |
1479 | Animals have not been led into homosexuality, because they value pleasure very little [Plutarch] |
5950 | If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch] |
5974 | People report seeing through rocks, or over the horizon, or impossibly small works [Plutarch] |
5957 | Absurd superstitions make people atheist, not disharmony in nature [Plutarch] |
5955 | No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch] |