Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Wilson,G/Schpall,S, H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim and La Rochefoucauld

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
7914 To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
7118 La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
7912 Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
7915 Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
7917 Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
7913 Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
7916 True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9299 We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld]