29 ideas
| 22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
| 12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
| 5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
| 412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
| 22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
| 18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
| 7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
| 16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
| 6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
| 6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
| 3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
| 7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
| 3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
| 12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
| 12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |
| 3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |
| 407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |