42 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |
3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |
407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |