Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Xenophanes, Vassilis Politis and Keith Hossack

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39 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack]
The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack]
Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes]
Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes]