Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Xenophon, John Perry and H.L.A. Hart

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37 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA]
Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA]
Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA]
Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA]
Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education is the greatest of human goods [Xenophon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]