34 ideas
| 6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
| 1507 | We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
| 5109 | The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle] |
| 1512 | Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
| 1508 | Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
| 17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
| 17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
| 17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
| 17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
| 17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
| 17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
| 17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
| 6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
| 6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| 6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
| 6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
| 6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
| 6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
| 6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
| 6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
| 6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
| 6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
| 6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
| 6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
| 6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| 6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
| 6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
| 454 | If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea] |
| 455 | That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea] |
| 1511 | If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius] |
| 6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
| 6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |
| 6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
| 6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |