18 ideas
| 8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
| 8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
| 19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
| 7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
| 5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
| 19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
| 19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
| 19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
| 19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
| 19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
| 19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
| 19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
| 19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
| 16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
| 8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
| 3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |
| 19673 | Galileo mathematised movement, and revealed its invariable component - acceleration [Galileo, by Meillassoux] |