Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Archelaus, Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J and Parmenides

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41 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
1502 Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
449 Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
448 No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
447 Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
445 The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
1503 There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
21820 Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
452 All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
1504 Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
444 The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
450 Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
451 Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
1506 Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3058 Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
555 People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
226 The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
5081 There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
1509 The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
20900 Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
1505 Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
453 Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
1792 He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
5115 It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
13217 The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
22918 What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
1794 He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
1791 He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]