Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Myles F. Burnyeat, Immanuel Kant and Daniel C. Dennett

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513 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant]
Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant]
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant]
Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant]
Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant]
Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C]
Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant]
You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant]
The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant]
It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner]
Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant]
Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard]
A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin]
A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant]
Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant]
Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant]
Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant]
If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant]
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant]
Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant]
Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant]
Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant]
Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant]
All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant]
Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard]
The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant]
Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant]
A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
No a priori concept can be defined [Kant]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter]
Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro]
Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant]
Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant]
Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant]
Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro]
Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant]
Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant]
All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert]
If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant]
Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant]
Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant]
The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant]
Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley]
If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant]
Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant]
The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant]
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter]
For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin]
Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant]
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie]
'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant]
Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel]
Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge]
Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard]
Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant]
If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant]
Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach]
In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach]
For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner]
The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard]
'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant]
'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant]
We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant]
We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant]
Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant]
A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley]
A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant]
One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant]
Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant]
The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge]
A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA]
Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie]
Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell]
We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant]
A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant]
That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant]
That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant]
The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant]
That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant]
The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant]
Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant]
7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant]
We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant]
A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant]
With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant]
A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant]
Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin]
Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant]
Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro]
Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant]
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant]
Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Dennett, by Lowe]
What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett]
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett]
Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant]
Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant]
Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant]
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant]
As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett]
We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett]
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant]
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant]
We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard]
If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant]
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant]
Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant]
Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett]
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett]
We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett]
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett]
Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett]
Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant]
Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate]
Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux]
Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant]
The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant]
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant]
Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard]
All human cognition is through concepts [Kant]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant]
How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant]
Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant]
Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant]
If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant]
Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant]
The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant]
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim]
Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant]
When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant]
Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch]
Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C]
Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard]
The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton]
The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]
An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard]
The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant]
What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant]
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / e. Altruism
Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant]
We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / f. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant]
A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant]
The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant]
Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant]
Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant]
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant]
The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant]
Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant]
The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant]
Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant]
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant]
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel]
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant]
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman]
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant]
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant]
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant]
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant]
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant]
It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant]
Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham]
Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant]
Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant]
Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant]
There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant]
A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant]
The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant]
No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant]
Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson]
Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant]
The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant]
Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant]
I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant]
Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant]
If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant]
Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG]
Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant]
Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant]
The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant]
Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie]
Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant]
Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant]
Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant]
Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant]
Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant]
For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse]
Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant]
If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant]
If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant]
The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant]
Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant]
A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant]
Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant]
The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The state of nature always involves the threat of war [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant]
There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant]
A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant]
There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant]
A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant]
Kant made the social contract international and cosmopolitan [Kant, by Oksala]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant]
The a priori general will of a people shows what is right [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
Each nation should, from self-interest, join an international security constitution [Kant]
A constitution must always be improved when necessary [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant]
Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant]
The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant]
Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Women have no role in politics [Kant]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm [Kant]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
Equality is where you cannot impose a legal obligation you yourself wouldn't endure [Kant]
Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
There is now a growing universal community, and violations of rights are felt everywhere [Kant]
There are political and inter-national rights, but also universal cosmopolitan rights [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant]
In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant]
Human life is pointless without justice [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin]
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War
The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant]
Hiring soldiers is to use them as instruments, ignoring their personal rights [Kant]
Some trust in the enemy is needed during wartime, or peace would be impossible [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory [Kant]
A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant]
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant]
Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell]
The Critique of Judgement aims for a principle that unities humanity and nature [Kant, by Bowie]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant]
Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose [Kant]
Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard]
We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares]
Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux]
Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant]
We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant]
Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant]
If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant]
That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Darwin's idea was the best idea ever [Dennett]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant]
We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre]
We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant]
Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein]
Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant]
Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant]
If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant]
If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant]
Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant]
You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B]
We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant]
Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant]
To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant]
From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant]