Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herman Cappelen, Richard L. Kirkham and Anil Gupta

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25 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta]
Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / b. Types of fact
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen]