Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anon (Dan), Keith Campbell and Scott Soames

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Resurrection developed in Judaism as a response to martyrdoms, in about 160 BCE [Anon (Dan), by Watson]