Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tim Button, Aenesidemus and Bob Hale

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale]
Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale]
Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale]
If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale]
Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale]
Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale]
The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / c. Facts and truths
There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale]
Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale]
It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale]
If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale]
Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale]
Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius]