Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Harr��,R./Madden,E.H and Epicurus

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204 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus]
Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus]
Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus]
If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus]
Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus]
Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus]
Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden]
Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden]
Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden]
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden]
Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus]
We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden]
Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden]
A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden]
A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden]
Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden]
People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden]
Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden]
There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden]
Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden]
There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero]
Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden]
Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]
The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden]
Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden]
Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden]
The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden]
The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden]
Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
We should accept as explanations all the plausible ways in which something could come about [Epicurus]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus]
The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus]
Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus]
Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus]
It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus]
The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus]
Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus]
Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus]
Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus]
Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus]
There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus]
Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch]
Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus]
What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden]
'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
A cosmos is a collection of stars and an earth, with some sort of boundary, movement and shape [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden]
Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
God does not intervene in heavenly movements, but is beyond all action and perfectly happy [Epicurus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden]
Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus]