Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Cappelen,H/Dever,J and Philolaus

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28 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
18405 A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
472 No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
18422 Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
18425 We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
18421 Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
18419 Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18404 It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
18407 Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
18427 If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
18426 All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
18428 You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
18429 Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
18413 Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
18417 Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
18408 Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
18414 Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
18423 All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
18406 The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
18411 It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
22511 Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
18420 We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
473 There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus]
1519 Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus]
1518 Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
469 Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
476 Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
1787 Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius]