### All the ideas for Michael Burke, Gordon Graham and E.J. Lemmon

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74 ideas

###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
 9535 'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
 9509 That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon]
 9510 That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon]
 9514 If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon]
 9511 We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon]
 9508 The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon]
 9512 We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon]
 9513 We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
 9532 'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon]
 9534 Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon]
 9516 A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon]
 9531 'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon]
 9519 A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon]
 9528 A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon]
 9518 A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon]
 9530 A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon]
 9529 A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon]
 9517 The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon]
 9533 A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
 9400 ∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon]
 9396 DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon]
 9397 CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon]
 9398 ∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon]
 9399 ∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon]
 9401 ∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon]
 9402 RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon]
 9395 MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon]
 9393 A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon]
 9394 MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
 9521 'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon]
 9522 'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon]
 9523 De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon]
 9526 We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon]
 9527 The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon]
 9525 We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon]
 9524 We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
 9537 Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon]
 9538 A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
 9536 If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 5. Completeness of PL
 9539 Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
 13909 Write '(∀x)(...)' to mean 'take any x: then...', and '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' [Lemmon]
 13902 'Gm' says m has property G, and 'Pmn' says m has relation P to n [Lemmon]
 13911 The 'symbols' are bracket, connective, term, variable, predicate letter, reverse-E [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / b. Terminology of PC
 13910 Our notation uses 'predicate-letters' (for 'properties'), 'variables', 'proper names', 'connectives' and 'quantifiers' [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
 13901 Predicate logic uses propositional connectives and variables, plus new introduction and elimination rules [Lemmon]
 13903 Universal elimination if you start with the universal, introduction if you want to end with it [Lemmon]
 13904 Universal Elimination (UE) lets us infer that an object has F, from all things having F [Lemmon]
 13906 With finite named objects, we can generalise with &-Intro, but otherwise we need ∀-Intro [Lemmon]
 13908 UE all-to-one; UI one-to-all; EI arbitrary-to-one; EE proof-to-one [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
 13905 If there is a finite domain and all objects have names, complex conjunctions can replace universal quantifiers [Lemmon]
###### 4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
 13900 'Some Frenchmen are generous' is rendered by (∃x)(Fx→Gx), and not with the conditional → [Lemmon]
###### 5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
 9520 The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q [Lemmon]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
 16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
 16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
 14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
 16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
 14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
 6685 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham]
###### 22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
 6698 Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham]
###### 22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
 6700 We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham]
###### 22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
 6699 The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham]
###### 23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
 6704 Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham]
###### 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
 6701 Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham]
###### 23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
 6693 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham]
###### 23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
 6691 It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham]
###### 23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
 6688 Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham]
###### 23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
 6705 Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham]
###### 23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
 6690 A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham]
###### 23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
 6689 The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham]
###### 29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
 6706 The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham]
###### 29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
 6709 Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham]