### All the ideas for Michael Burke, Theodosius and Diodorus Cronus

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

13 ideas

###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
 16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
 16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
 14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
 16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
 14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
 5998 From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
 20832 The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus]
###### 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
 14304 Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
 1799 If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
###### 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
 6024 Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]