### All the ideas for Michael Burke, David J.Chalmers and William S. Jevons

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

66 ideas

###### 3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
 14713 Truth in a scenario is the negation with that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
###### 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
 8628 I hold that algebra and number are developments of logic [Jevons]
###### 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
 2392 Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
###### 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
 2393 Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
 2394 Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
###### 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
 2398 Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
###### 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
 16048 Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
###### 7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
 2401 All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
 16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
 16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
 14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
 16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
 16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
 13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
###### 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
 14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
 16424 Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
 16425 Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
###### 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
 16426 How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
###### 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
 13956 Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
###### 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
 13963 Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
 16473 Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
 19258 Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
###### 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
 2407 One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
###### 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
 2390 We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
###### 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
 14712 A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
###### 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
 2397 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers]
###### 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
 2422 The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers]
###### 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
 2396 Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
 2426 Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
 2391 Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
 2412 Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
 2386 Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
 2416 What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
 2423 Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
 2403 Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
 2400 Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
 2419 Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers]
 2389 Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
 2402 It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers]
###### 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
 2415 In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers]
###### 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
 2414 When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
 2409 Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
 2411 Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
 2424 It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
 2413 If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
 2417 Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
 2428 Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
 2418 The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
 2406 H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
 2405 Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
 2395 Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
 9318 Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
 2404 Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
###### 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
 2429 Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
###### 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
 18403 Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers]
###### 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
 14708 Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
 13958 The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
 13959 The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
 2399 Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
 13957 Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
 13961 We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
 14739 'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
###### 19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
 13962 Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
###### 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
 13960 In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
###### 28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
 16427 Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers]