Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Burke, Michael della Rocca and Alexander Miller

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]